By Kashif Ahmed
I understand Fares Shehabi’s point to some extent, however, I think he may have been expecting too much from Russia.
Now there are those who might argue that Mr. Shehabi, an independent MP who lost his seat in the 2020 elections, is just jostling for attention. And maybe he is. But we mustn’t let that overshadow some of the more troubling observations he’s made regarding an increase in Israeli terrorism & what he perceives as Russia’s indifference to it.
ASTANA OR BUST
The U.S.-Israel-EU-India wants Russia to make the same mistakes in Syria that the Soviets made in Afghanistan. But this isn’t the old Cold War, its the new Cold War: The U.S. didn’t come into this off a plethora of ‘wins’ (e.g. Operation Condor, Urgent Fury etc), they instigated the Syrian conflict during one of their biggest defeats (i.e. Afghanistan). New Russia isn’t the USSR, the FSA aren’t the Mujaheddin, and Bashar Al-Assad definitely isn’t Gen. Najibullah: The Soviets were wrong in Afghanistan, because they were there to annex the country & prop up a Judeo-Communist cabal that was in league with the Israelis & the Indians (via the KGB-Mossad-RAW-KHAD axis). The Russians are right in Syria, because they halted a major U.S.-EU-Israeli regime-change operation, which would have allowed Jewry to implement the ‘Eretz Israel’ (‘Greater Israel’) land-grab (i.e. Yinon Plan).
Russia sees itself as a man-for-all-seasons: A friend of the East but the BMOC of the West: The Kremlin is eager to work with China-Pakistan-Iran-Turkey-Iraq and others in the blossoming East. But also has to maintain its sphere of influence / dominance over a historically hostile, Rothschild-controlled US.-EU whilst simultaneously attempting to accelerate America’s irrelevance in the ME (ensuring that the U.S. and its proxies leave the 35-40% of Syrian territory they still occupy). Syria is one part (an important part, but one part nonetheless) of Russia’s global strategy in the new Cold War and vice versa for Syria.
SIEGE & SANCTIONS
After Libya 2011, Russia had to show the world they could support their allies militarily–Putin proved that in Syria and Crimea. Now Moscow wants to portray Syria as being independent enough from both Iran and Russia, to encourage investments from Europe and the GCC. Iran doesn’t have as much influence abroad to attract the sort of capital required to rebuild Syria. Russia, on the other hand, does; but only if it positions itself as a sort of guarantor for potential investors– e.g. Putin can say to everyone: “Gentlemen, you’re not doing business with Bashar Al-Assad, you’re doing business with us; the people that bought you (Arabs) S-400, that raised the alarm for you (Turks) about the CIA-Gulen coup and kept your (Europeans) homes warm in Winter: Syria isn’t being rebuilt because Tehran says so, its being rebuilt because its in all our best interests for this to happen”.
Needless to say, the smooth repatriation of Syrian refugees is key to the plan, and the entire process has to be managed in such a way that Syria isn’t asked to compromise on the very policies (i.e. being a staunch ally of Palestine, Iran and Lebanon) that allowed Damascus to beat the U.S.-Israeli conspiracy in the first place.
Ultimately; Syria, Russia, Iran and Turkey will also have to make a decision about what to do with the U.S. backed SDF and other Kosher-Kurdish terror outfits (e.g. PKK, YPG) in the area: ‘Rojava’ will, at some point; have to be pacified in order to liberate the Northeastern oil fields and give Syria’s economy a much needed boost.
Obviously Russia is looking to secure a wide-range of strategic / economic interests in the region (interests that are, for the most part, acceptable to Syria and her allies) but also wants to highlight its prowess as a stabilizer: Vladimir Putin wants to achieve in Syria what he managed to achieve in the Caucus; Moscow wants to show us that they took a failing-state and made it better than, or as good as, it was before U.S.-EU-Israeli-Indian interference: The basic idea is to neutralize U.S. sanctions / Caesar Act, whilst respecting Syria’s regional objectives vis-a-vis Palestine-Lebanon and improve Bashar Al-Assad’s standing with fellow Muslims.
We (and I’m sure Fares Shehabi would concur with me on this) want Syria to become a front-line state against Jewish extremism (which it already is to some extent). Whereas Russia wants Syria to first become economically stable enough to stand on its own, and get in with China’s New Silk Road ASAP. We want that too, but I think both options will have to be synchronized in order to reap the maximum benefit: Syria must become economically stable, but not at the cost of appeasing Zionism in any way, shape or form.
THE JEWISH QUESTION
I think Russia’s relationship with the illegitimate state of Israel is similar to the U.S.-Israel’s ties with the apartheid regime in South Africa in the 1970s-80s: Most Western governments had links with the Boers all the way to the end (the CIA and Mossad were actively supporting them in Angola, Namibia and Mozambique). But knew deep-down that apartheid was on its way out, and no one was prepared to risk themselves beyond a certain point to prevent its downfall.
So whilst Russia is highly unlikely to ever overtly engage the Zionists in combat (and will continue to turn a blind eye to the Jewish terror state’s targeting of resistance groups on the ‘border’) it has no vested interest in preventing Israel’s demise either. Just like Russia had no interest in saving Indian occupiers from being driven out of Ladakh by China, bailing out the Indians after Pakistan’s Operation Swift Retort, or intervening on Armenia’s behalf in Azerbaijan.
That said, its up to Damascus to maintain a firm stance by upholding its resistance credentials: Whether that’s putting a ‘Made in Syria’ sticker on all allied groups in the country, or creating a framework that shows the world that any retaliation against the IOF from Syria, comes from Syria and no one else. But retaliate Syria must, for as I pointed out in Al-Assad Mauls The Mossad: How Syria Survived U.S.-Israeli Conspiracy Syria will have to take many confirmed-kills against the enemy, to persuade Tel Aviv to re-evaluate its bite & bail strategy.
Now maybe I just haven’t heard it, but I don’t hear Bashar Al-Assad talking that much about ‘Israel’ being the epicenter of evil, or of being the main culprit behind the destabilization of his country: He must mention this, and mention it all the time: Let Syria’s allies and enemy’s know where we stand. Respect Russia’s right to hold their view but make your own views & objectives clear as well.
SYRIA’S FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION
Lets be honest, we all know what some people are like; politicians, businessmen, feudals; we have more corrupt characters in our midst (whether that’s in Syria, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan or elsewhere) than we sometimes care to admit. China and Russia has these types as well, but both countries tend to take a more… robust approach in dealing with them. The U.S. EU are brimming with these crooks too (but most of them tend to commit crimes for their country rather than against it).
Now Russia can’t personally take up a grievance with some corrupt Baathist official because, 1) Its none of their business and 2) It just wouldn’t look right. All they can do is subtly suggest that so-and-so maybe needs to be investigated, or perhaps quietly point out this-or-that guy is ripping off the state or running a scam. And then its up to President Al-Assad to see what needs to be done about it.
Syria is a heroic country for standing up to U.S.-Israeli terrorism and we should salute the SAA for their efforts, but victory came at a price and that price is taking its toll:
“Syria has sustained the biggest losses of all the conflicts in the Middle East. From 2011 through 2018, GDP fell by almost two thirds from $55 billion to $22 billion a year. This means that recovery costs (that amount to at least $250 billion) are equal to 12 times the current GDP. According to the World Bank, about 45% of housing has been destroyed, including a quarter of it that was razed to the ground.
Over half of health facilities and about 40% of schools and universities are out of operation: Since the war, the living standards of 80% of the Syrians have dropped below the poverty line, and their life span has decreased by 20 years. Syria is short of doctors and nurses, teachers, technicians and qualified government officials.
The economic challenges now faced by Syria are even more serious than during the active phase of hostilities. It is in the economy that a web of old and new problems has emerged, and this is not just due to the catastrophic destruction during the war or US and European sanctions, although the humanitarian consequences are very sensitive, especially for the majority of the population.
In the course of military de-escalation, Syria is reluctant or unable to develop a system of government that can mitigate corruption and crime and go from a military economy to normal trade and economic relations.
Local ‘law’ continues to prevail even in the government-controlled areas, including kickbacks in trade, transit, transport shipments and humanitarian convoys in favor of a chain consisting of privileged army units, security services, commercial mediators and related loyal big-time entrepreneurs, both those that are traditionally close to the president’s family and those that have become rich during the war.
The war produced centers of influence and shadow organizations that are not interested in a transition to peaceful development although Syrian society, including business people and some government officials, have developed requirements for political reform.
The situation in Syria, which is being aggravated by non-military, albeit no less dangerous, challenges, is compelling the Syrian government to properly assess the current risks and draft a long-term strategy with consideration for the fact that the main components of a conflict settlement are closely linked.
A new military reality cannot be sustainable without economic reconstruction and the development of a political system that will rest on a truly inclusive approach and international consent. This is particularly important because the next presidential election in 2021 is not far off”.
Aleksandr Aksenenok, Former Russian Ambassador to Syria, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation, Managing Director of Vnesheconombank and a member of the Expert Council of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs.
Syria is by no means a Russian vassal state, and is slowly but surely coming back onto the scene as a powerful nation unto itself: There is, however, a need to slightly adjust the old Cold War mentality / pseudo-Communistic / plutocratic mindset of some people, and reassess the state of play as it exists today: Syria won the war to secure her survival, now everybody has to survive the war to ensure her stability.
Forward March 